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In metaphysics, the concept of "being" is often analyzed in terms of substance, existence, and relation. Some philosophers have argued that nothing can exist in complete isolation, as being itself implies some kind of relation—whether to space, time, or other beings. From Aristotle to Heidegger, philosophy has debated whether existence is absolute or only makes sense within a network of connections.

If we were to imagine a being completely isolated, with no relation to anything else, would it still exist in any meaningful sense? Or does existence necessarily require reference, interaction, or context? Can something "be" without being "something in relation to something else"?

Geremia
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This longer quote is quite fun, for reasons that would be evident, but to get it one has to bear in mind staid Heidegger's definition of Being in Being & Time (1927)

‘Being’ cannot indeed be conceived as an entity; enti nun additur aliqua natura: nor can it acquire such a character as to have the term “entity” applied ‘to it. H4

16 years later the approach has changed. Hang on for the ride. From On Inception, § 3

Being-there is not without the steadfastness of the human.

But how, then, should beyng remain independent of the human? Just because the human belongs to the grounding of the truth of beyng, this does not mean that beyng depends on the human in such a way that beyng would be established by the human.

So how does the human belong to beyng?

As steadfastness in the clearing, which intercepts the happen-stance of beyng in its truth and safeguards the possibility that a world be configured. In the whole domain of this preceding question, being is immediately understood as what is constant. Being itself is not being thought in its inceptuality. Thus, one places “value” on the inner certainty of beings in their constancy, as if it was through constant duration that they were most in being [am seiendsten]. What is forgotten, though, is to ask with what right this claim about beings might be made, and on what grounds being might be equated with constancy.

What remains entirely beyond reach is the admittedly disconcerting possibility that being, and not just beings, sometimes is not; and that, if decided in this way, the essence of this not-being is such that it even refuses the essential unfolding of the nothing. Thus, being must indeed be entirely remote [abgeschieden] in its essence: there can be no destruction or elimination of being, since it is neither produced nor made.

So now it's down to the ambiguity of the 'existence' of being and the twilight dawn of inception.

Chris Degnen
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Nobody can say ‘Yes’ to this question. If somebody says that 'being' can exist without any kind of relation, that means the ephemeral world we experience having so many relations does not have any kind of being. Also, the Mahavakya -- Sarvam Kvalidam Brahm – everything is the self-shining pure being, becomes vain. Moreover, no one who has realized this ultimate truth could have come back to this world having so many relations to teach this truth again.

A separation having 'existence with relations' and 'existence without relations' regarding 'being' is unreasonable.

https://hinduism.stackexchange.com/questions/17357/what-is-sankara-ved%C3%A0nta-explanation-of-sarvam-khalvidam-brahm

If you find any contradictions in this idea, a passage on the teachings of Ramana Maharshi (in the link above) will certainly clarify.

SonOfThought
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