There is an SEP article on the proposed incommensurability of at least some conflicting pairs of scientific theories, which goes over Kuhnian and Feyerabendian proposals regarding this incommensurability. Perhaps ironically, the article concludes by comparing two theories of incommensurability that might themselves be meta-incommensurable! (Note that the article does briefly emphasize the commensuration/comparison distinction, however, in that same concluding section.)
Now, is it possible that a manifestation of scientific incommensurability might be explanatory incommensurability with regards to degrees of theoretical simplicity/complexity? Must we always assume that elements of pairs of theories can be ratioed one to another along this line? I wonder, for example, if an elaborate conglomerate of multiversal set theory, pluralistic modal logic, and a mechanism for a unified field would be neither more nor less nor equally complex (much less simple!) in comparison with a divine nature having exotic meta-properties such as divine simplicity (plus, somehow, tri-unity and the capacity for incarnation, say). As I've noted before, in Cantor's set world, there seemingly (as far as I can tell, anyway) would have been no nontrivial elementary embeddings of his divine counterpart to V, into that counterpart itself or models of V (or sets that model fragments of V), for such would conflict with his depiction of the divine transet (as an ens simplicissimum). But the presence or absence of order-indiscernibles/sharps (including class-many of them) is the kind of thing that might make commensurability hard to attain to even on a purely mathematical level, so if we tried to move from that level to a physically explanatory one, would we be able to commensurate a physical theory involving e.g. Cantor's God with a physical theory coupled to a set theory with endless amounts of order-indiscernibles/sharps/w/e along those lines?
